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Executive Summary   
 
This report describes an incident involving the potential exposure of a laboratory technician at the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to live (non-inactivated) Ebola virus.  The incident 
occurred on December 22, 2014, on CDC’s Roybal Campus in Atlanta during procedures for a study being 
conducted as part of the public health response to the ongoing West Africa Ebola outbreak.  The 
potential exposure of the laboratory technician resulted from the inadvertent transfer of potentially live 
Ebola virus from one of CDC’s high containment biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories to a lower 
biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) laboratory, where the laboratory technician processed the material.  The 
laboratory technician completed 21 days of monitoring and reported no illness.  Subsequent studies 
conducted at CDC have determined that the mistakenly transferred samples likely did not contain live 
virus, and posed no safety risk to CDC staff or the broader community.   
 
Description of the incident 
 
The incident involved staff from CDC’s Viral Special Pathogens Branch (VSPB), which conducts public 
health research on highly pathogenic viruses and has played a central role in the Agency’s response to 
the current Ebola outbreak.  Staff involved in the incident were conducting an animal-model study to 
gain information to help determine if the current strain of Ebola virus was more virulent compared to 
other outbreak strains and if oral fluid swabs could be used in disease diagnosis efforts.  The study 
involved taking two oral swabs daily from each of the study animals and then placing the swabs in two 
sets of tubes—one designated for live-virus studies and the other for studies with inactivated material.  
The tubes were distinguishable only by colored caps and pre-printed labels.  The incident occurred when 
the tubes designated for live-virus studies were mistakenly prepared for transfer out of the BSL-4 
laboratory and then subsequently taken to the BSL-2 laboratory for additional studies.  On December 
23, CDC laboratory scientists involved in the study discovered the problem, took immediate steps to 
minimize the possible risk to workers in the BSL-2 laboratory, and promptly reported the incident to 
their leadership, with standard notifications made for select agent or toxin exposures.  Leadership of the 
CDC BSL-4 laboratory where this incident occurred immediately suspended transfers out of the 
laboratory until a full review of the incident is completed and appropriate improvements are 
implemented.  In addition to the internal investigation of the incident described in this report, per 
standard protocol, CDC’s Division of Select Agent and Toxins and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 




An internal investigation was conducted by a team of CDC laboratory scientists from other parts of the 
Agency, who interviewed persons directly involved with the incident as well as others who had specific 
knowledge of the incident and related activities.  The overriding causes of this incident were related to 
inadequate safeguards, including lack of a written study plan that had been approved by a supervisor 
and a workflow that was not designed to sufficiently minimize the possibility that human error could 
result in exposure.  Other underlying factors included lack of a centralized point of contact in VSPB for 
laboratory safety and select-agent compliance; lack of project oversight and continuity in day-to-day 
leadership; and the lack of full implementation of recent laboratory safety enhancement requirements, 








This report describes specific actions underway at CDC to improve laboratory safety, recommended 
actions for VSBP to address factors that may have caused or contributed to the incident, and actions to 
address issues identified from this incident that may have implications for all CDC BSL-3 and BSL-4 
laboratories.  Examples include ensuring full understanding and implementation of actions 
recommended as part of CDC’s ongoing laboratory safety improvement efforts, such as proper 
completion of a required form for materials taken out of CDC’s high containment laboratories to lower 
biosafety level laboratories and appropriate secondary verification measures for critical safety control 
points.  New remediation actions specific for the VSPB laboratory include the designation of a senior 
scientist to ensure select-agent compliance.  Broader recommendations for CDC’s BSL-3 and BSL-4 
laboratories include the establishment of a peer review system of written research plans to help 
optimize workflows and minimize safety errors; the use of multiple, visual safeguards (e.g., coloring for 
liquids, distinctive size and shape for specimen handling and storage containers); and steps to improve 
safety for laboratory staff working outside of normal work hours.   
 
Laboratory safety at CDC 
 
Ongoing efforts to ensure that appropriate lab safety procedures are followed and that continuous 
improvements occur are essential for safeguarding CDC staff and the broader community.  Although this 
incident clearly highlights the importance of ongoing efforts to identify and address potential gaps in 
laboratory safety at CDC, progress has been made over the past several months.  Actions include 
creation of a new position of CDC Associate Director for Laboratory Science and Safety; review and 
approval of all inactivation methods for highly pathogenic organisms; an inventory of all stored biologic 
materials; and broader engagement of CDC laboratory staff and stakeholders to better inform 
laboratory safety recommendations.  As part of these efforts, CDC has formed an external laboratory 
safety working group, under the Advisory Committee to the Director, composed of experts in biosafety 
and related areas, as well as an internal Laboratory Safety Improvement Workgroup (LSIW), which has 
worked closely with CDC laboratory scientists and leadership to identify and implement new safety 
procedures.  Moving forward, CDC will continue to work to identify and implement systems and 
procedures that can further improve the Agency’s laboratory operations and reduce safety risks, 






On December 22, 2014, material from an Ebola virus experiment that could have contained live Ebola 
virus was inadvertently transported from one of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) 
high containment biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories to a lower biosafety level laboratory (biosafety 
level 2 [BSL-2]).  Both laboratories were part of the same CDC organizational branch and were select-
agent approved.  Although appropriate inactivation procedures were conducted, samples that had been 
prepared for viral culture studies and that were to be maintained in the BSL-4 laboratory were 
mistakenly thought to be the inactivated material, placed in a sealed transfer container, then moved out 
of the BSL-4 laboratory to the BSL-2 laboratory for additional studies.  One laboratory technician worked 
with the material in the BSL-2 laboratory and had the potential to be exposed to live virus (the 
technician did not become ill, and subsequent studies have determined that the samples likely did not 
contain live virus).  On December 23, CDC laboratory scientists involved in the study discovered the 
problem and promptly reported it to their leadership, with standard notifications made for select agent 
or toxin exposures.  The CDC BSL-4 laboratory where this incident occurred immediately suspended 
transfers out of the laboratory until a full review of the incident is completed and appropriate 
improvements are implemented.  This report reviews the circumstances related to this event, outlines 




Ebola virus disease (Ebola), previously known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever, is a rare and frequently fatal 
disease caused by infection with one of the Ebola virus species.  Ebola viruses can cause disease in 
humans and nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and chimpanzees).  Ebola viruses are found in 
several African countries.  Ebola was first discovered in 1976 near the Ebola River in what is now the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo; outbreaks have since appeared sporadically in Africa.  In 2014, the 
largest outbreak of Ebola on record began in West Africa, resulting in an unprecedented public health 
crisis in the region and potentially throughout the world.   
 
Laboratories involved in the incident 
 
The incident involved staff from CDC’s Viral Special Pathogens Branch (VSPB), which conducts public 
health research on highly pathogenic viruses, many of which cause hemorrhagic manifestations in 
humans.  Examples include Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Lassa fever virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Crimean-
Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, and other arenavirus and hantavirus species.  Because of the severity of 
illness they cause and lack of effective treatment, almost all of these viruses are classified as BSL-4 
pathogens and as such must be handled in special facilities designed to contain them safely.  VSPB 
operates one of the world's few BSL-4 laboratories.  Among its responsibilities, VSPB provides technical 
and research support and diagnostic materials to many international laboratories and collaborators. 
VSBP staff members are trained to respond to global disease outbreaks and provide assistance for 
disease detection and control measures. The Branch also is responsible for developing, evaluating, and 
improving methods for treatment, prevention, and laboratory diagnosis of hazardous disease agents. 
VSPB has approximately 50 staff members organized into seven teams.  VSPB is located in CDC’s Division 
of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology (DHCPP), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic 






The incident occurred during a study being conducted as part of the public health response to the 
ongoing West Africa Ebola outbreak.  The study team included five staff members:  two veterinary 
scientists (Scientists 1 and 2), and three laboratory technicians (Laboratory Technicians 1, 2, and 3).  The 
incident directly involved Laboratory Technician 1, Laboratory Technician 2, and Scientist 2.  However, 
only Laboratory Technician 2 worked with the material outside of the BSL-4 laboratory.  Laboratory 
Technician 1 was a veterinary technician, and Laboratory Technician 2 was trained in molecular virology.  
Laboratory Technician 3, also a veterinary technician, had been previously assisting Laboratory 
Technician 1.  Scientist 1 (the research group lead) and Laboratory Technician 3 were on leave the day of 
the incident. 
 
Methods Used in Reviewing this Incident 
 
In conducting an internal review of the incident, a team of CDC laboratory scientists from other parts of 
the Agency interviewed the persons directly involved with the incident as well as others who had 
specific knowledge of the incident and related activities.  Each person was interviewed individually; 
interviews included a standard set of questions, as well as specific questions based on the individual’s 




Description of the Event 
 
Appendix A provides a timeline of major events. 
 
Study Design   
 
The study, involving animal models, was designed to determine if the current strain of Ebola virus was 
more virulent compared to previous prototype strains (1976 Mayinga strain and the guinea pig-adapted 
virus variant) and to evaluate whether oral fluid swabs could be used to confirm disease diagnosis and 
determine infectiousness.  These data would help guide and inform response activities in Ebola-affected 
areas, which has been a critical need in the ongoing Ebola outbreak, and build a collection of 
postmortem specimens for pilot testing rapid diagnostic tests on oral fluids prior to their use in humans 
in West Africa.  Collectively, this information could be used to further understand and develop more 
informed guidelines for appropriate timing of Ebola virus diagnostics in the field and to provide data to 
supplement analyses of data generated from human patient materials collected during CDC’s Ebola 
surveillance activities in West Africa. 
 
CDC’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) had approved the protocol for the animal 
work that was done.  In addition, CDC’s Laboratory Safety Improvement Workgroup (LSIW) had 
reviewed and approved the protocol for the inactivation procedures used in the study (consistent with 
recently implemented requirements), and the laboratory staff performing the study followed this 
protocol (including completion of checklist and supervisory notification of start and end of inactivation) 
on the day of the incident.  However, although the study researchers had discussed and rehearsed the 






Two swabs were collected from each animal daily for 15 days.  The two swabs were placed in separate 
vials, each containing different solutions:  one vial contained lysis buffer for virus inactivation and 
subsequent nucleic acid testing, and the second vial contained virus transport media (VTM) for 
subsequent virus isolation attempts.  Although both were clear, uncolored solutions and were in the 
same type of tube (2.0 ml Sarstedt™ tubes), the tubes for VTM had a preprinted “Virus Transport 
Media” label and a blue cap, compared to unlabeled, noncolored-capped tubes, for the lysis-buffer.  For 
the study, both the VTM and the lysis-buffer tubes were hand-labeled with sequential numbers, 
corresponding to each animal number tested.  All sample preparation work was performed in the VSPB 
BSL-4 select agent-registered laboratory; the nucleic acid testing was done in a VSPB select agent-
registered BSL-2 laboratory after inactivation of the virus was complete. 
 
How the incident occurred 
 
The incident occurred on Monday, December 22, 2014 (14 days after the beginning of the study).  On 
that day, Laboratory Technician 1 prepared two sets of tubes in the BSL-4 laboratory as described above 
and placed them into a tube rack for sample collection from each experimental animal.  After weighing, 
each animal was briefly swabbed in the oral cavity with two long, polyester-tipped swabs (a noninvasive 
and nondistressful procedure) taking approximately 10 seconds per animal.  On previous days, this 
procedure had been typically done by Laboratory Technician 1 and Laboratory Technician 3 together, 
but on this day was completed by Laboratory Technician 1 only.  The research group lead (Scientist 1), 
along with the rest of the study team, had determined previously that one experienced animal 
technician could safely complete this task.  
 
During sample collection, one swab was placed into each of the separate tubes (containing lysis buffer 
or VTM).  The VTM tubes were to remain in the BSL-4 laboratory for later virus isolation attempts.  By 
study design, one swab per animal was to be placed directly into a VTM tube and then the swab handle 
snapped off.  After swabs were taken, the VTM tubes were to be resealed with their original blue-
colored caps and placed in the -80˚C freezer in the BSL-4 laboratory. 
 
Unlike the VTM tubes, the lysis-buffer-containing tubes were hand-labeled with the animal number only 
(no pre-printed label or colored cap), since these tubes were just a temporary container used prior to 
the same-day transfer of the liquid from them into a 96-well deep block.  The swab handles for the lysis-
buffer tube specimens were not snapped off so that the swabs could be removed from lysis buffer and 
discarded by the laboratory technician responsible for the transfer of lysis buffer samples to the BSL-2 
laboratory.  
 
After sample collection was complete, normal procedure for this experiment was for the laboratory 
technician who took the swabs from the animals to leave the rack with the lysis-buffer tubes containing 
the long-handle swabs in the BSL-4 animal room biosafety cabinet (BSC) for later transfer to a 96-well 
block by a second laboratory technician.  To prevent any possibility of non-inactivated particles being 
present on the lysis-buffer tubes, the transfer of the tube contents to the block was performed in the 
BSC of the BSL-4 animal room.  The lysis buffer used (MagMax®, guanidinium chaotrope) requires a 10-
minute inactivation time, which was generously exceeded due to the practical nature of the collection 
step from each animal and the time required to organize the tubes and then to physically transfer their 
contents to the 96-well block.   
 
On the day of the incident, Laboratory Technician 1 snapped the handles off of the swabs in the  




BSL-4 laboratory.  Consequently, the VTM tubes, with intact swabs, were left in the BSC in the BSL-4 
animal room for subsequent processing by Laboratory Technician 2.  When processing the mistakenly 
placed VTM tubes from the BSC, Laboratory Technician 2 did not notice the “Viral Transport Media” 
label present on all of the specimen tubes.  Also, since the long swabs were left in the tubes, the colored 
caps were not present for Laboratory Technician 2 to see, and visually the tubes looked identical to the 
lysis-buffer tubes, except for the label.  Laboratory Technician 2 removed and discarded the swabs, 
transferred the specimens from the VTM tubes to a 96-well plastic block, heat-sealed the block with foil, 
placed the sealed block into the BSL-4 disinfectant dunk tank (which ensures no virus is present on the 
outside of the block), and contacted Scientist 2 to retrieve the specimen block from the outer corridor 
side of the dunk tank.  In retrieving the 96-well block in the outer corridor, Scientist 2 visually inspected 
it for sample volume and adequate sealing; however, since the fluid colors of the lysis buffer and VTM 
were the same, there was no indication that the liquid in the block came from the VTM tubes.  The block 
with the VTM material was then placed in a secondary container and taken from the BSL-4 outer 
corridor to the BSL-2 laboratory.   
 
Laboratory Technician 2 left the BSL-4 laboratory (through standard, decontamination exiting 
procedures) and went to the BSL-2 laboratory and processed the specimens following approved 
protocols for nucleic acid assay.  Because of the mix-up in the sample tubes, Laboratory Technician 2 
could have been exposed to Ebola virus while transferring the specimens into the laboratory equipment 
that was used to process the specimens for the assay.  However, subsequent studies have determined 
that the samples likely did not contain live virus at this stage, and Laboratory Technician 2 did not 
become ill. 
 
On December 23, 2014, Scientist 2 entered the BSL-4 laboratory and noticed that the previous day’s 
specimens in the freezer did not have VTM labels, suggesting the wrong samples may have been 
transferred out of the BSL-4 laboratory the previous day.  Scientist 2 immediately notified Scientist 1 and 
Laboratory Technician 1, and then immediately called the BSL-2 laboratory and asked all personnel to 
leave the laboratory until the potential inappropriate transfer had been confirmed or refuted.  Scientist 
1 and Laboratory Technician 3 visually confirmed the sample mix-up by examining the BSL-4 waste area 
and finding the VTM-labeled tubes.  This indicated that the contents of the VTM tubes rather than the 
contents of the lysis-buffer tubes had been taken to the BSL-2 laboratory for nucleic acid testing on 
December 22. 
 
The VSPB Branch and Division leadership immediately notified the CDC’s Responsible Official for select 
agent or toxin exposure and the Director of CDC’s Environment, Safety, and Health Compliance Office 
(ESHCO), following standard protocol.  CDC leadership was notified and informed officials at the 





VSPB Results from Ebola Virus Isolation Studies:  As part of the post-incident assessment, swab samples 
that had been collected the work days before and after the incident (December 19 and 23, respectively) 
were studied to evaluate if detectable live virus could have been present in the samples removed from 
the BSL-4 laboratory on December 22 (samples from the day of the incident had been destroyed during 




on both December 19 and December 23, suggesting that there was likely no live virus in the samples 
that were mistakenly taken out of the BSL-4 laboratory on December 22.    
 
Causes of the Laboratory Incident 
 
The overriding causes of this relate to inadequate safeguards: 
 
1. Lack of a written study plan that had been approved by a supervisor  
Although there was an IACUC-approved protocol for animal handling and sampling and an LSIW-
approved protocol for the study’s inactivation procedures (consistent with requirements), there 
was not a written, approved study plan that outlined each of the steps that were to be followed 
in the experiment.  Approval of overall study plans is not currently required.   
 
2. A study plan workflow that was not designed to sufficiently minimize the possibility that 
human error could result in exposure   
The study included placing identical oral swab samples from guinea pigs into two different sets 
of tubes, one for inactivation with nucleic acid extraction and one for virus isolation. The tubes 
were identical in brand and size, except for a blue cap and preprinted label on the tubes for 
virus isolation. Because the caps had been removed so the swabs could be collected and placed 
into the tubes, the tube caps did not provide the visual cue that was intended to distinguish 
between the two types of tubes.  The collection of specimens and the extraction procedure 
were done by two different individuals, which also could have contributed to the error. 
 
The two laboratory technicians and the laboratory scientist directly involved in the incident are 
experienced researchers, each with 5-10 years of experience working in BSL-4 laboratories, and 
had conducted these procedures uneventfully for the prior 2 weeks.  Their inattentiveness 
regarding the differences in the tubes being used for inactivation and for virus growth media 
indicated an incomplete understanding of the workflow process as well as inadequacies in the 
workflow process itself, both of which could have contributed to the mix up of the sample 
tubes.  
 
Other underlying factors that contributed to these direct causes include the following: 
 
1. Lack of centralized point of contact for both laboratory safety and select agent compliance  
VSPB does not have a designated individual responsible for monitoring laboratory safety and 
regulatory compliance.  VSPB is part of a high containment laboratory (HCL) suite of BSL-4 
laboratories that includes other CDC organizational groups.  Other user groups in the HCL suite 
have dedicated safety and compliance points of contact that are knowledgeable of regulations, 
protocols, and procedures, and have accountability to ensure safety is prioritized and adherence 
to select agent requirements is followed.   
 
2. Lack of project oversight and day-to-day leadership continuity  
While an established HCL manager provides oversight for all groups in the HCL suite (e.g., 
oversight of physical facility issues, ensuring new users have appropriate training), VSPB does 
not have a full-time laboratory manager, and principal investigators are expected to provide 
oversight and management for their own studies.  In addition, for the last 6 months, the Branch 
Chief has been deployed for the Ebola response and there have been several staff rotations to 




3. Lack of full implementation of recent laboratory safety enhancement requirements 
In the last several months, CDC has implemented a number of safety enhancements. One of 
these includes the requirement that a Material Transfer Certificate (MTC) be completed for 
transfer of any material from high containment laboratories to lower biosafety level 
laboratories, including internal transfers.  These certificates must describe all inactivation 
methods used and be signed by involved parties.  This new procedure had not been fully 
implemented by the VSPB laboratories, and was not done for the transfer of specimens out of 
the VSPB BSL-4 laboratory to the VSPB BSL-2 laboratory on December 22.   
 
An additional recently implemented laboratory safety improvement measure has been the 
requirement for secondary verification of critical safety control points, such as those involving 
inactivation of infectious agents.  To fully meet these requirements, VSPB was taking steps to 
install a camera system to allow for additional verification that procedures were performed 
following protocol. 
 
Full implementation of these two requirements may have had the potential to reduce the 
likelihood of this incident.  VSPB is working to implement these two recommendations prior to 
resuming full BSL-4 operations.  The camera systems are currently being installed in the BSL-4 





In addition to recommendations for VSPB relating to this specific event, the incident has also highlighted 
issues that have implications for other CDC high containment laboratories.  These actions are now being 
addressed as part of CDC’s overarching laboratory science and safety improvement efforts, which began 
after earlier laboratory errors were identified (http://www.cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/index.html), and 
have resulted in the implementation of new safety enhancement actions.   The recommendations are 
outlined across three categories: 
 
I. Continued implementation of ongoing CDC laboratory safety improvement efforts 
 
1. Leadership should ensure full understanding and implementation of previously recommended 
laboratory safety improvement actions, including the following:  
 
 The completion of an MTC for transfer of any material from high containment 
laboratories to lower biosafety level laboratories.  MTCs must describe all inactivation 
methods used and be signed by involved parties.  In situations where a hand off of 
materials between laboratory staff must be made, the MTC should ensure that the 
transfer is made in person and that both the originator and the recipient of the 
materials understand exactly what material is being exchanged and how it has been 
processed.  Acknowledgment by both parties of the nature of the materials being 
handed off creates an additional checkpoint where errors might be recognized and 
corrected.  Reduction in the number of steps and handoffs is well known in the medical 
field as a measure to prevent error.   
 
 Appropriate secondary verification of critical safety control points, including additional 




II. Additional safety enhancements recommended specifically for VSPB 
 
2. Enlist a team to evaluate preparations that have been performed by the laboratory technicians 
involved in this incident to confirm that similar errors related to processing the wrong tubes for 
nucleic acids did not occur.   
 
3. Identify a designated, senior scientist who understands the scientific basis for the procedures 
used in both the diagnostic and research activities of the Branch, maintains select agent 
compliance, ensures appropriate competency-based training, and serves as a resource for 
scientists if they have safety or security questions.  This person should enter the laboratory on a 
routine basis (preferably daily) to provide consistent oversight.  Having a designated, 
experienced laboratory safety point of contact will be increasingly critical as laboratories adopt 
new diagnostic and analytic technologies that may necessitate changes in safety measures.   
 
4. Ensure mission-critical work is not affected when key leaders are deployed or on detail to 
support other public health priorities.  To the extent possible, a consistent leader should be 
available to provide day-to-day oversight and prioritization of activities, enabling laboratory 
scientists to minimize lower priority work.  Leadership should determine which, if any, activities 
(including both programmatic and research) can be eliminated or suspended without significant 
impact.  And, for the remainder of the current Ebola response, VSPB should identify a single 
point of contact (with designated backup) to serve as Acting Branch Chief to provide consistent, 
on-site leadership.   
 
III. Additional safety enhancements recommended for CDC high containment (BSL-3 and BSL-4) 
laboratories 
 
5. Work with CDC scientists from high containment laboratories to establish a peer-review system 
of written research plans to foster critical thinking on how to optimize workflows and minimize 
error. 
 
6. Enhance standard operating procedures for materials intended for inactivation and removal 
from laboratories: 
 
 Ensure that all materials are in standard, appropriately labeled tubes.   
 
 Ensure the use of multiple, redundant visual safeguards (e.g., coloring for liquids, 
distinctive size and shape specimen handling and storage containers) so that laboratory 
staff can more easily determine that the correct material is being taken out of a high 
containment laboratory.   
 
 Unless exceptions are reviewed and cleared by a supervisor, establish a requirement 
that inactivation procedures for a single protocol be performed or, at a minimum, 
checked by a single, highly trained individual within that team who understands the 
scientific reasons for each step of the procedure.  This “from beginning to end” concept 
of processing high-risk pathogens intended for transfer from high containment 
laboratories to lower biosafety level laboratories would help ensure a greater sense of 
the personal responsibility required for these processes, given the commensurate risks 




 When possible and not detrimental for the end use of the materials, samples coming 
out of the BSL-4 laboratory should undergo gamma irradiation sufficient to inactivate 
any virus present. Materials not irradiated should require extra attention to verification 
of the inactivation procedures employed. 
 
7. Because of the unique circumstances of BSL-4 work, further enhance safety for individuals 
working in the BSL-4 laboratory outside of normal work hours:   
 
 Establish an on-call system to ensure after-hours availability of a BSL-4 supervisor or 
designee.  These individuals should be experienced laboratory scientists who have 
access to the facility, are familiar with the process to enter and exit the laboratory, are 
authorized to enter the laboratory, and are capable of responding if health or technical 
issues arise.   
 
 Develop a standard operating procedure that 
— requires laboratory staff entering the BSL-4 laboratory after hours and on 
weekends to inform the on-call individual of their plans, and 
— contains steps to ensure that laboratory staff have exited safely.   
 





Ongoing efforts to ensure that appropriate lab safety procedures are followed and that continuous 
improvements occur are essential for safeguarding CDC staff and the broader community.  While the 
incident described in this report highlights the need for continued improvements in laboratory safety 
practices across the Agency, progress has been made in this area over the past several months, including 
the establishment of a new office of the Associate Director for Laboratory Science and Safety.  In 
addition to the recently implemented laboratory safety measures described earlier in this report, the 
LSIW has also worked with CDC laboratory scientists and leadership to identify other areas for 
improvements, including expansion of biosafety training and improvements in research standards and 
protocols.  The Agency has also undertaken an inventory of all stored biologic materials, and engaged 
CDC laboratory staff and stakeholders to better inform recommendations for improving laboratory 
safety.  As part of these efforts, CDC formed an external Laboratory Safety Workgroup of the Advisory 
Committee to the Director, comprising experts in biosafety and related areas.    
 
After the recommendations outlined in this report have been implemented, CDC will convene an 
external review of safety and security procedures, processes, policies, and organizational effectiveness 
of VSPB.  The review will be conducted by an independent, non-conflicted external group in order to 
facilitate transparency and objectivity in their findings.  The group will include members of the external 
Laboratory Safety Workgroup as well as other scientists with extensive experience working in BSL-4 
laboratory settings and with technical expertise in biosafety, biosecurity, records management, 
informatics, and regulatory affairs.  Consistent with standard procedures, APHIS has also conducted an 
investigation of this incident, and any additional recommendations from this review will also be 





The new position of Associate Director for Laboratory Science and Safety will report to the CDC Director 
and have responsibility to provide Agency-wide leadership and accountability for laboratory science, 
safety, and quality.  The position announcement was posted on USAJobs (https://www.usajobs.gov/); 
the position has closed, and recruitment is underway.  Moving forward, this individual will engage 
leadership from high containment laboratories both within and outside of CDC to gather lessons learned 
and establish practices and standardization across CDC that can directly and effectively enhance 
laboratory safety.   
 
CDC is committed to ongoing efforts to identify and implement systems and procedures that can further 





Appendix A.  Timeline of Major Events 
 
December 19 (Friday)  
 Viral Special Pathogens (VSBP) staff member prepares 500 μl-aliquot of MagMax® lysis buffer 
into clean, 2.0 ml microtubes (Sarstedt™) in VSPB’s BSL-4 laboratory for use in an animal-model 
study undertaken as part of the ongoing Ebola outbreak response.  Aliquots of 500 μL of virus 
transport media (VTM) had been previously obtained from CDC’s Core Facility, pre-prepared 
into clean 2.0 ml microtubes (Sarstedt™).  Although both solutions were in 2.0 ml Sarstedt™ 
microtubes, VTM tubes have a pre-printed “Virus Transport Media” label and a blue cap to 
prevent confusion.   
 Aliquots were stored in refrigeration in the BSL-4 laboratory over the weekend 
 
December 22 (Monday)  
 Following study protocol and using the above-described microtubes, a veterinary technician 
(Laboratory Technician 1) took 2 oral swabs from each animal and placed individual swabs into 
separate tubes containing lysis buffer (for inactivation) or VTM (for future virus isolation studies)   
 In error, Laboratory Technician 1 left the VTM tubes instead of the lysis-buffer tubes in the BSL-4 
biosafety cabinet (BSC).  The lysis-buffer tubes were placed in the BSL-4 freezer.   
 Following safety protocols approved for removal of RNA specimens from the BSL-4 laboratories 
and assuming the VTM tubes were the lysis-buffer tubes, a second laboratory technician 
(Laboratory Technician 2) transferred the liquid from the VTM tubes into a 96-well block, foil 
sealed the block, and placed the sealed block into the disinfectant dunk tank  
 Following normal protocol, a study team member (Scientist 2) transported the specimen block 
in a secondary container from the VSPB BSL-4 laboratory to a VSPB BSL-2 laboratory, where it 
was stored sealed in the laboratory’s refrigerator 
 Laboratory Technician 2 left the BSL-4 laboratory, went to the BSL-2 laboratory, and processed 
the specimens following approved protocols for nucleic acid assay, which included 
decontamination of equipment and work areas with bleach solution between steps and after 
completion. 
 
December 23 (Tuesday) 
 Scientist 2 noticed that the frozen tubes remaining in the BSL-4 were the lysis tubes and not the 
VTM tubes, and notified the research group lead (Scientist 1).  Visualization by study team 
members of the empty VTM tubes in the BSL-4 waste confirmed the mistake.   
 Upon verification, all areas of the VSPB BSL-2 laboratory where the sample processing occurred 
were surface decontaminated and all waste autoclaved. 
 Personnel who were present in the VSPB BSL-2 laboratory at any point between time of 
processing and decontamination were identified.  Laboratory Technician 2 was determined to 
have some risk of potential exposure and began a 21-day monitoring period, per current 
guidance.   
 Following standard notification protocol, VSPB Branch and Division leadership notified CDC’s 
Responsible Official (RO) of a potential select agent or toxin exposure , as well as the Director of 
the CDC Environment, Safety, and Health Compliance Office (ESHCO) and CDC leadership 
 CDC leadership notified HHS of incident  
 Summary of incident forwarded to CDC Division of Select Agent and Toxin (DSAT), as an initial 





December 24 (Wednesday) 
 USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) officially notified of the incident  
 Notification of the incident sent to CDC employees 
 CDC notification of news media 
 
December 27 (Saturday) 
 APHIS/CDC Form 3 Report submitted by CDC RO 
 DSAT acknowledges receipt of APHIS/CDC Form 3 Report 
 
December 29 (Monday)  
 Initial internal review meeting held  
 
December 30 (Tuesday) 
 Additional decontamination of affected areas complete.   
 Personnel interviews began as part of the CDC internal review.  
 
January 5 (Monday) 
 Personnel interviews completed. 
 
January 6 (Tuesday) 
 APHIS/DSAT visits CDC to conduct an inspection in response to the laboratory incident.  
 
January 9 (Thursday) 
 APHIS/DSAT inspection completed. 
 
January 10 (Saturday) 
 ESCHO report with recommendations regarding re-entry of personnel into the affected BSL-2 
laboratory is completed and shared with senior leadership. 
 
January 12 (Monday) 





Appendix B.  Definitions and Terms 
 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) – A multi-function agency within the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) responsible for protecting and promoting U.S. agricultural health, 
regulating genetically engineered organisms, administering the Animal Welfare Act, and carrying out 
wildlife damage management activities. The Agricultural Select Agent Service (AgSAS) is part of this 
agency.  
 
Biosafety cabinet (BSC) (also called biological safety cabinet) – The primary means of containment used 
for working safely with infectious microorganisms that are designed to provide personnel, 
environmental, and product protection.  
 
Biosafety Level (BSL) – The risk criteria used to define the four ascending levels of containment, referred 
to as biosafety levels 1 through 4 based on infectivity, severity of disease, transmissibility, and the 
nature of the work conducted.  
 
Decontamination – The treatment of environmental surfaces (e.g., laboratory areas) to render any 
infectious materials sterile and nonpathogenic.  
 
High Containment Laboratory (HCL) – Any biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) or biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) 
laboratory.      
 
Inactivation – The process of treating an infectious agent to render it noninfectious and nonpathogenic.  
 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) – an oversight body mandated by the Animal 
Welfare Act to review all research studies involving animals at CDC to ensure compliance with animal 
welfare standards.  
Laboratory Safety Improvement Workgroup (LSIW) – A group established by the CDC Director to 
accelerate improvements in CDC laboratory safety and monitor incident recommendations. 
 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) – Equipment that is worn to minimize exposure to workplace 
injuries or illnesses. 
 
Responsible Official (RO) – The individual designated by an entity with the authority to ensure 
compliance with the Select Agent Regulations at the entity. 
  
 
 
 
